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a_century_of_war [2011/06/08 04:06]
will [8. A Sterling Crisis and the Adenauer-de Gaulle Threat]
a_century_of_war [2012/06/15 00:51]
dan [The Gulf War]
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 The Anglo-American planned response was to create a pretence under which military forces could once more take tight control of Middle Eastern oil, to resecure the "veto power" that control of these supplies granted America over continental Europe, Russia and Japan.  Iraq seemed like the obvious choice: thought to be the largest source of unexplored oil fields after the Soviet Union, and far more closely allied with France and Russia than Saudi. The Anglo-American planned response was to create a pretence under which military forces could once more take tight control of Middle Eastern oil, to resecure the "veto power" that control of these supplies granted America over continental Europe, Russia and Japan.  Iraq seemed like the obvious choice: thought to be the largest source of unexplored oil fields after the Soviet Union, and far more closely allied with France and Russia than Saudi.
  
-Iraq had been tempted into war with Iran by spurious American intelligence promising easy victories, and emerged from the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 with massive war debts to the Russia and Eastern Europe (who expected to be repaid in oil), Kuwait, Saudi and French, British and American banks: a total of $65bn.  Kuwait had been encouraged by the UK-US to extend extensive credit to Iraq in order to prevent the Iraqis suing for peace, because of the profits the UK-US was making from arms sales.  In the spring of 1990, with UK-US encouragement Kuwait changed tack, rapidly increasing oil output and forcing the price down from $19 to $13 a barrel.  Iraq and other OPEC members pleaded with Kuwait to return within its OPEC quota, but the Kuwaitis refused.  Iraq became unable to service its debt.+Iraq had been tempted into war with Iran by spurious American intelligence promising easy victories, and emerged from the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 with massive war debts to Russia and Eastern Europe (who expected to be repaid in oil), Kuwait, Saudi and French, British and American banks: a total of $65bn.  Kuwait had been encouraged by the UK-US to extend extensive credit to Iraq in order to prevent the Iraqis suing for peace, because of the profits the UK-US was making from arms sales.  In the spring of 1990, with UK-US encouragement Kuwait changed tack, rapidly increasing oil output and forcing the price down from $19 to $13 a barrel.  Iraq and other OPEC members pleaded with Kuwait to return within its OPEC quota, but the Kuwaitis refused.  Iraq became unable to service its debt.
  
 Saddam started drawing attention to the American insistence on maintaining a large naval presence in the Middle East, despite Russia's increasing incapacity to project force in the region and the end of the Iran-Iraq war.  He called for greater pan-Arab cooperation and the use of oil wealth to forge better relations with Europe, Russia and Japan. Saddam started drawing attention to the American insistence on maintaining a large naval presence in the Middle East, despite Russia's increasing incapacity to project force in the region and the end of the Iran-Iraq war.  He called for greater pan-Arab cooperation and the use of oil wealth to forge better relations with Europe, Russia and Japan.
a_century_of_war.txt ยท Last modified: 2019/11/08 10:39 (external edit)