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| Easterly suggests three main explanations as to why education has failed to deliver the economic growth that so many expected. The first is the use to which educated people are putting their skills. Many countries in which government intervention in the economy is extensive create a variety of opportunities for well-educated people to profit by lobbying government or working the system. For example, foreign exchange controls tend to create an opportunity for intelligent black market currency trading, at the expense of government and importing or exporting firms. A second reason is the way in which education has been provided, generally by the state and often compulsorily. The quality of education is often very bad. Teachers are underpaid and unmotivated, and students are not provided with basic materials like books and pens that they need to succeed. In some context teaching posts are a form of political patronage and teachers are overprovided whilst nothing is spent on basic teaching materials. The final reason is other trends within the economy. Unless there is investment in machinery and technology that is generating a demand for those skills then the creation of these skills will have no economic impact. It ought to be true that the generation of a high-skill workforce creates incentives to invest in machinery and technology, but it is equally possible that government policy has more than offset this incentive. | Easterly suggests three main explanations as to why education has failed to deliver the economic growth that so many expected. The first is the use to which educated people are putting their skills. Many countries in which government intervention in the economy is extensive create a variety of opportunities for well-educated people to profit by lobbying government or working the system. For example, foreign exchange controls tend to create an opportunity for intelligent black market currency trading, at the expense of government and importing or exporting firms. A second reason is the way in which education has been provided, generally by the state and often compulsorily. The quality of education is often very bad. Teachers are underpaid and unmotivated, and students are not provided with basic materials like books and pens that they need to succeed. In some context teaching posts are a form of political patronage and teachers are overprovided whilst nothing is spent on basic teaching materials. The final reason is other trends within the economy. Unless there is investment in machinery and technology that is generating a demand for those skills then the creation of these skills will have no economic impact. It ought to be true that the generation of a high-skill workforce creates incentives to invest in machinery and technology, but it is equally possible that government policy has more than offset this incentive. | ||
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| ===== Cash for Condoms ===== | ===== Cash for Condoms ===== | ||
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| This presentation often seems a little dishonest. For one thing, even in his theoretical explanation of the economics of the situation, Easterly does not mention fixed factors. He uses the rapid increase in agricultural productivity in the post-war period to deny that land should be regarded as a limited resource, not mentioning the dependence on this expansion on another fixed resource, oil. He does not mention water as a fixed resource. He does not mention the likelihood that these constraints, particularly oil and water, only become significant when they bind, as they seem likely to do in the first half of the twenty-first century. | This presentation often seems a little dishonest. For one thing, even in his theoretical explanation of the economics of the situation, Easterly does not mention fixed factors. He uses the rapid increase in agricultural productivity in the post-war period to deny that land should be regarded as a limited resource, not mentioning the dependence on this expansion on another fixed resource, oil. He does not mention water as a fixed resource. He does not mention the likelihood that these constraints, particularly oil and water, only become significant when they bind, as they seem likely to do in the first half of the twenty-first century. | ||
| - | He argues that the fact of large numbers of unwanted births is a myth, that 90 per cent of the variation in fertility across countries is accounted for by variation in desired fertility. 10 per cent seems like an awful lot to me, but apparently not to him. He argues as an economist that the decision of how many children to have is far too important to be significantly influenced by the subsidisation of condoms, which would be supplied cheaply by the market if they were desired. He argues that it is impossible for people to be unable to afford contraception if contraception is cheaper than having children. He notes that various authors have predicted famine and disease to result from population growth in the last few decades, primarily Paul Ehrlich,((1968, The Population Bomb.)) and that these disasters have not transpired. He also summarises a literature that finds no association between population growth and per capita GDP growth. There is no empirical evidence that population growth is harmful. Furthermore, by far the most robust finding is that increase in income reduces fertility, that the most foolproof method to reduce population growth is to increase economic growth (again this ignores the view that both population and economic growth push us towards binding resource constraints and in this respect might be equally 'harmful). He briefly discusses the externalities of having children as a justification for subsidising contraception, concluding that there are both positive and negative externalities and it is difficult to conclude that one set easily outweighs the other. | + | He argues that the fact of large numbers of unwanted births is a myth, that 90 per cent of the variation in fertility across countries is accounted for by variation in desired fertility. 10 per cent seems like an awful lot to me, but apparently not to him. He argues as an economist that the decision of how many children to have is far too important to be significantly influenced by the subsidisation of condoms, which would be supplied cheaply by the market if they were desired. He argues that it is impossible for people to be unable to afford contraception if contraception is cheaper than having children. He notes that various authors have predicted famine and disease to result from population growth in the last few decades, primarily Paul Ehrlich,((1968, The Population Bomb.)) and that these disasters have not transpired. He also summarises a literature that finds no association between population growth and per capita GDP growth. There is no empirical evidence that population growth is harmful. Furthermore, by far the most robust finding is that increase in income reduces fertility, that the most foolproof method to reduce population growth is to increase economic growth (again this ignores the view that both population and economic growth push us towards binding resource constraints and in this respect might be equally problematic). He briefly discusses the externalities of having children as a justification for subsidising contraception, concluding that there are both positive and negative externalities and it is difficult to conclude that one set easily outweighs the other. |
| HIV is not mentioned once, not even from a purely economic standpoint. | HIV is not mentioned once, not even from a purely economic standpoint. | ||