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| fair_trade_for_all 2010/07/02 07:05 | fair_trade_for_all 2010/07/02 07:08 current | ||
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| > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. And it is hard to conceive of a trade agreement that would prohibit the development of such technologies through defence programmes. (Even the EU has complained about America's use of defence expenditures as a hidden subsidy for its aerospace industry.) ---p105 | > A blanket proscription against government subsidies to technology (industrial policies) is likely to have an adverse effect on developing countries and, indeed, it is likely in practice to be unfair: the United States conducts its industrial policy largely through the military, which supports a wide variety of technological developments that eventually have important civilian applications. And it is hard to conceive of a trade agreement that would prohibit the development of such technologies through defence programmes. (Even the EU has complained about America's use of defence expenditures as a hidden subsidy for its aerospace industry.) ---p105 | ||
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| ====== Priorities for a Development Round ====== | ====== Priorities for a Development Round ====== | ||
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| * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member) | * multilateral enforcement (non-injured parties can also retaliate against an offending member) | ||
| * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU) | * monetisation of sanctions (developing countries can sell the right to sanction to other members for whom the sanction would be more valuable, eg if Nicaragua won a dispute against the US, it could sell the right to impose duties to China or the EU) | ||
| - | * institutional reform | + | * institutional reform: |
| * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries | * creation of evaluation unit within the WTO to assess likely impact of measures on developing countries | ||
| * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc) | * greater transparency (elimination of the Green Room, etc) | ||